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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Paul Timothy Shattuck for the Master of Science in
Sociology presented April 29, 1997.

Title: Evaluating Modernization And Dependency Explanations Of The Unequal
Distribution Of Income In Developing Countries

This paper tests two different theoretical explanations of the causes of the
unequal distribution of income in less developed countries using data from circa 1990.
There are several reasons for examining this much-studied topic. First, as described in
the previous research findings chapter below, there is no consensus in the literature
regarding the relative effects of modernization and dependency variables on income
inequality. Determining the independent effects of the two models is still an open
ended question. Second, the availability of more recent data provides us with an
opportunity to check the possibility that previous findings were partly due to the
idiosyncratic nature of data that happened to be available circa 1970. Replication is its
own justification in this regard. Finally, the rapid increase of economic globalization
since 1970 raises the possibility that dependency effects (via more widespread and
intensive foreign capital penetration) may actually have increased since previous data
was collected.
Multiple regression analysis is used to test several different sets of independent
variables derived from the two theoretical perspectives. Results demonstrate strong

support for the effects of a core modernization model (the percent of labor force
working in agriculture, sectoral dualism, secondary education enrollment rate, and
population growth) and foreign investment dependence net of one another. Results
also suggest the possibility that investment dependence effects have intensified while
modernization effects have attenuated since circa 1970.
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INTRODUCTION
All nations produce and import economic resources that are used to sustain and
enrich life for members. The unequal distribution of economic goods has long been a
staple of social research. The sociological perspective on this economic question
entails seeing how the unequal distribution is produced, maintained, or reduced by
social processes and institutions. A number of previous studies have examined
dependency and modernization explanations of income inequality using data from the
1960s and early 1970s (Crenshaw and Ameen 1993, Bornschier and Chase-Dunn
1985, Tsai 1995, Nielsen 1994 & 1995, Lecaillon et. al. 1984, Dixon and Boswell
1996). I have not found any cross national studies of developing countries that use
data more recent than the early 1970s.
There are several reasons for examining this much-studied topic. First, as
described in the previous research findings chapter below, there is no consensus in the
literature regarding the relative effects of modernization and dependency variables on
income inequality. Determining the independent effects of the two models is still an
open ended question. Second, the availability of more recent data provides us with an
opportunity to check the possibility that previous findings were partly due to the
idiosyncratic nature of data that happened to be available circa 1970. Replication is its
own justification in this regard. Finally, the rapid increase of economic globalization
since 1970 raises the possibility that dependency effects (via more widespread and
intensive foreign capital penetration) may actually have increased since previous data
was collected.

This paper tests two different theoretical explanations of the causes of the
unequal distribution of income in less developed countries (LDCs) using data from
circa 1990. I initially set out to attempt a longitudinal analysis of changes in inequality
from 1970 to 1990 as well. However, insurmountable problems with data availability
and comparability led me to drop this line of inquiry.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
There are many competing explanations of what causes income inequality in
LDCs. Urban bias, the lack of democratic institutions, international exploitation
(dependency and world systems theory), and the effects of modernization and
economic development are all frequently encountered in the literature. I will compare
Kuznets' hypothesis relating economic modernization to inequality with dependency
theories relating international exploitation to inequality. Modernization theory is often
pitted against dependency theories to see which provides a more powerful explanation
of intranational income inequality. I will follow this convention.
Urban bias posits an inter-sectoral and inter-regional income inequality that is
outside the scope of this paper's goals. 1 The relationship between government
institutions and inequality is most likely substantial. However, due to the problems
associated with specification, operationalization, and data availability (see Sirowy and
Inkeles 1991 for a thorough discussion of these challenges and a review of research) I
will not include this as an independent variable in my analysis.
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Dependency Theories:
The diverse array of perspectives grouped together under this heading all share
the general proposition that the unequal and exploitative nature of the relationships
between rich and poor countries produces inequality within poor countries. Thus, a
nation's status within the world economy and the resultant organization of production
3

bear directly upon its internal distribution of national wealth. Generally speaking,
there are differences between world systems theory and dependency theory. However,
the specific hypotheses I will examine in this paper do not fall clearly into one camp or
the other. Therefore, I use the term 'dependency' rather more loosely than I would if I
were writing a paper about different theoretical perspectives on development.
Brazilian economist Theotonio Dos Santos formulated a definition of
dependency:
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries
is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which
the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more
economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of
dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be
self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a
reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative
effect on their immediate development. (1970, p. 193)

Bomschier and Chase-Dunn ( 1985) develop a set of arguments about the
causes of inequality that draw from dependency and world systems theory. These
propositions are the most thoroughly developed and tested ones from this perspective.
The main assumption from this perspective is that the class structure within a country
is in part a reflection of that country's status, location and role in the economicgeographic world hierarchy of nations.
Thus an alliance between core ruling classes (whether mediated by
transnational corporations or core states) and peripheral ruling classes
(Galtung's "bridgeheads") will tend to produce greater inequalities within
peripheral countries because the peripheral elite will be able to use the resource
of core support to gamer income and other advantages to itself. It will also be
more able to successfully resist demands for redistribution. This argument
4

implies that it is not a low level of development that creates high inequality,
but rather peripherality in the world division of labor and its associated class
structure. (p. 23)
The key to their arguments is that participation in the world system gives local
political and economic elites a vested interest in pursuing policies and activities that
stabilize and further their privileged status and thence reinforce or increase inequality.
The segment of the peripheral economy that is integrated into the worldeconomy is privileged vis-a-vis the marginalized majority. This
institutionalized privilege acts as a measure to stabilize the world-hierarchy by
the principle of "divide et impera." It is not necessary to assume that specific
actors consciously act like this. The frame of reference for the integrated part
of the population is the world society. Therefore, the striving for participation
in the bourgeois lifestyle of this reference system is likely to produce privileges
relative to the average life situation in peripheral countries. The integrated
population tries to increase its consumption in order to keep up with core
standards. A larger income gap and more intense marginalization in poorer
countries than in richer ones is thus likely to be the consequence. (p. 120)
More specifically, Bomschier and Chase-Dunn argue that transnational
'corporate penetration' in LDCs creates and bolsters a local elite class that is then
motivated by self interest to pursue policies and activities that foster income
inequality. Foreign investment penetration in developed countries is not associated
with inequality in their model. Their argument distinguishes among three types of
corporate investment in poorer countries: extractive and agricultural industries,
manufacturing for the world market, and manufacturing for the domestic market.
According to Bomschier and Chase-Dunn modem agricultural and extractive
industries tend to be very capital intensive ventures that pay employees a high wage
relative to the average for that country. Although accounting for a small percentage of
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the total work force, these high wage earners will tend to oppose wealth redistribution
policies. Thus, foreign corporate investment in extractives (Bornschier and ChaseDunn begin their argument by grouping agriculture and extractives but then end by
talking only about extractive industries with no explanation of why agriculture was
dropped) should lead to rising levels of inequality as wage earners in the sector
mobilize against redistributive policies. McMichael (1996) fills in the argument
connecting investment in agriculture and income inequality. Investment and aid aimed
at modernizing/westernizing the agricultural sector disproportionately benefits wealthy
families who can afford the new technology and seeds. As the productivity of rich
families' land increases as a result of adopting new techniques, their income starts to
grow more distant from poorer families' income. Also, rising land values result in
higher rents for tenant farmers thereby reducing their income. The combined effect of
rising incomes among wealthy families and stagnant or declining incomes among
poorer families is growing income inequality .
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn go on to argue that political regimes in LDCs can
have two different motivations for fostering income inequality depending on whether
they are trying to attract firms that manufacture for the world or the domestic market.
Firms that manufacture for the world market tend to seek out labor that is cheap
relative to its productivity. Thus, political regimes that materially benefit from the
presence of such firms will seek to attract and retain them by pursuing policies that
keep wages low (for instance prohibiting unions and strikes). Firms that manufacture
6

for the domestic market are only interested in the wealthy minority who can afford the
products. In the long run it might be to corporations' advantage to foster growing
equality and wealth for all so that the market demand would expand. However, in the
short term logic of corporate decision making, according to Bomschier and ChaseDunn, firms are only interested in those who can buy their products now. Thus, a
domestic market with a small but wealthy elite who can afford the products is arguably
more attractive to manufacturers than one with an egalitarian distribution of limited
wealth among a larger populace who would not be able to buy any product. Therefore,
political regimes will again act to maintain inequality in order to attract and retain
firms. Maintenance of low wages in manufacturing combined with growing wages
among the local government and managerial elites creates growing inequality.
There are also other, less renowned, theories of the connection between foreign
investment and inequality. Crenshaw and Ameen (1993) argue that foreign direct
investment (FDI) 3 in agriculture leads to land enclosure, labor shedding and
unemployment. In tum, these lead to landlessness, poverty, and labor over-supply
(thereby depressing wages). Pan-Long Tsai (1995) argues that foreign direct
investment (FDI) creates a minority of privileged elites associated with the FDI sector.
These elites then actively oppose any government redistributive policies that may
diminish their incomes. Timberlake (1985) argues that the FDI in peripheral and semiperipheral nations leads governments to increase coercive control of labor in order to
attract more FDI.
7

Dependence is also thought to be created via external debt and foreign aid.
Nembhard (1993) argues that foreign aid (which is often in the form of loans) often
exacerbates national inequality because it tends to favor large projects, privileged
sectors (i.e. large landholders), and entrenched local elites. She goes on to cite
numerous case examples where aid bypassed the poor and mainly benefited elites and
transnational corporations. Also, the austerity measures imposed on severely indebted
countries are argued to exacerbate inequality because one of the International
Monetary Fund's strategies to keep LDCs solvent is to promote the cutting of
government employee and contract wages. This sends a ripple effect through the
economy and depresses incomes especially at the low end of the earnings distribution.
Chan (1989), Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), and Tsai (1995) have all
found a significant correlation between foreign direct investment and national income
inequality in LDCs. All of these cross sectional studies focus on data from the 1960s
and early 1970s.

Modernization:
The classic theoretical statement linking modernization and income inequality
was put forth by Simon Kuznets (1955). His conclusions were based on mathematical
models of sector dualism and an analysis of the historical experience of Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States. He hypothesized an inverted U-curve
relationship between industrialization and inequality with inequality first increasing
and then decreasing as a country industrializes.
8

Kuznets' main argument revolves around the sectoral shift of the labor force a
country experiences as it industrializes. He conceptually divides a country's economy
into two sectors: agriculture and all others. Once the economy is divided into two
labor sectors then the level of national income inequality can be disaggregated into
three sources. First, a difference in average income between the two sectors can
contribute to national inequality. This inter-sectoral difference is referred to as sector
dualism. Second, inequality in the distribution of income within either or both sectors
can affect national inequality. Finally, national inequality is dependent on the share of
the labor force participating in each sector.
Based on his historical analysis of the United States, Germany, and the United
Kingdom Kuznets speculated that average incomes are typically higher in the nonagricultural than agricultural sector. This supposition has been consistently upheld by
empirical evidence. For instance, Lecaillon et. al. (1985:55) report sector dualism for
twelve developing countries in the early 1970s. The ratio of non-agricultural to
agricultural income ranged from 2.03:1 in Iran (1972) to 8.85:1 in Swaziland (1974).
Thus, even if we assume the distribution of income within each sector is
similar, income inequality will increase and then decrease over time if there is a shift
of population from the sector with the lower average income to the one with the higher
average income. Kuznets illustrates this point with a table which I have simplified and
reproduced as Table 1. "The basic assumptions used throughout are that the per
capita income of sector B (nonagricultural) is always higher than that of sector A
9

[agricultural]; that the proportion of sector A in the total number declines; and that the
inequality of the income distribution within sector A may be as wide as that within
sector B but not wider" (Kuznets, 1955 p.12). In Table 1 sector B's average income is
twice that of sector A. Two different distributions are modeled for each sector. One
distribution is moderately unequal (distribution E) and the other is very unequal
(distribution U). Distribution E assumes a 5.5% share of total income accruing to the
lowest decile of the population with each successive decile's share increasing by one
percent culminating in 14.5% for the highest decile. Distribution U starts with one
percent of total income for the lowest decile increasing by 2% each decile reaching
19% for the top tenth income group.
Table 1 illustrates what happens, given the above assumptions, as the
population shifts from 80 to 20 percent in sector A. In all three scenarios inequality
first increases and then decreases as population shifts. Based on this example and
other mathematical models (Nielsen 1994), the theoretical turning point in the
inequality trend is reached when the proportion of population in sector A decreases to
approximately sixty percent.
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Table 1. Percentage shares of the first and fifth quintiles in income
distribution under varying assumptions, from Kuznets (1955, p. 13)

Proportion of Sector A to Total Population
Per capita income of total
population (assuming income
per head in sector A= 50, in
sector B = 100, 2:1 ratio)
Distribution E for both sectors
Share of first quintile
Share of fifth quintile
Range
Distribution U for both sectors
Share of first quintile
Share of fifth quintile
Range
Distribution E for sector A, U
for sector B
Share of first quintile
Share of fifth quintile
Range

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

10.5
34.2
23.7

9.9
35.8
25.9

9.6
35.7
26.l

9.3
34.7
25.3

9.4
33.2
23.9

9.8
31.9
22.1

10.2
30.4
20.2

3.8
40.7
36.8

3.8
41.9
38.1

3.7
42.9
39.1

3.7
42.7
39.0

3.8
41.5
37.8

3.8
40.2
36.4

3.9
38.7
34.8

9.3
37.7
28.3

8.3
41.0
32.7

7.4
42.9
35.4

6.7
42.7
36.0

6.0
41.5
35.5

5.4
40.2
34.8

4.9
38.7
33.8

Key: E = moderately equal, U = very
uneaual

This analysis begs the question of what causes inequality within sectors and
what accounts for the difference in average income between sectors. Kuznets argued
that in the early phase of industrialization there is a massive dislocation of people from
rural to urban areas. Recent migrants to the cities are considered to be at a wage
negotiation disadvantage because of their unfamiliarity with urban and industrial ways
of life. Massive dislocation to urban areas combined with rapidly declining death rates
and maintenance of high birth rates works to swell the low-wage labor pool (referred
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to as 'swarming' by Kuznets). The glut oflow-wage, dislocated laborers and their
negotiation disadvantage combine to depress wages at the low end of the income
distribution. Furthermore, the rapid rate of creation and explosive growth of new
industries leads to a "rapid rate of creation of new fortunes" (Kuznets 1955, p. 18)
which increases the wages and the number of wage earners at the top end of the
income distribution. The combination of depressed wages at the low end and inflated
earnings at the top end of the income distribution leads to an overall increase in
income inequality during the early phase of industrialization.
Kuznets went on to argue that as industrialization progresses the growth in
income inequality reaches a peak and then begins to decline for a variety of reasons
other than the sectoral shift dynamic. The share of aggregate income accruing to
society's top earners decreases as a result of progressive taxes and a decreased rate of
fortune building due to declining industrial growth rates. Progressive taxes and social
safety net laws also lead to a redistribution of wealth that increases wages at the
middle and bottom of the income distribution. Labor laws combined with the
increased cultural competence and urban savvy of rural migrants' descendants leads to
increased bargaining power for lower income groups and hence higher wages. Also,
declining rates of rural to urban migration coupled with falling birth rates (as a result
of the demographic transition) evens out the match between labor supply and demand
thereby reducing the downward pressure on wages resulting from an oversupply of
labor. Thus, increasing wages for low-income groups combined with a decrease in top
12

earners' share of aggregate income lead to declining income inequality as
industrialization progresses.
More recently, the work of Francois Nielsen (1994, 1995) has sought to
elaborate and refine the initial work of Kuznets. He has developed a core model of
four independent variables which he argues captures the linear and curvilinear
(transitory) effects of development on inequality. This model includes sector dualism,
percent of labor in agriculture, secondary school enrollment rate, and natural rate of
population increase. Secondary school enrollment is proposed as a measure of human
capital diffusion and accumulation in the general population. As the supply of
educated workers increases there is an expected increase in competition for higher
wage jobs which will produce a downward effect on wages at the top end of the
earnings distribution and thereby contribute to a decline in inequality. He further
speculates that some dependency or world system influences on income inequality
would most likely be mediated via this core model.
"My (unverified) assumption is that the effects of 'external' world-system
variables would be largely channeled through some of the internal variables
(such as sector dualism) that are included in the core model. An immediate
area for further research would be to subject this assumption to the test and
explore the role of world-system variables in inequality processes within
countries." (Nielsen 1994 p. 673)
Thus, from this perspective, dependency variables should not add appreciably to the
explanatory power of the modernization model.
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Crenshaw and Ameen (1993), Nielsen (1994 & 1995), Lecaillon et. al. (1984)
and Chan (1989) found positive effects that lend support to modernization theory's
hypothesized link between economic development and inequality. As with the above
cited dependency studies, the data for these studies focused on the 1960s and 1970s.

Differences Between Modernization And Dependency Theories:
It is important to highlight some of the main differences between these two
theoretical perspectives. First of all, modernization theory focuses on intranational
causes of inequality while dependency focuses on international causes. Secondly, they
both share the same short term prediction of growing income inequality associated
with initial industrialization. Finally, they diverge in their long range predictions
about inequality. Modernization predicts that national economic growth will
eventually take care of inequality 'naturally'. Regardless of its source, investment is
good because it promotes growth - capital is capital. Inequality is viewed as a
transitory phenomenon. Dependency theory predicts long term maintenance and even
worsening of inequality as a result of growth stimulated by foreign investment and
trade. All capital is not created equal from this perspective. Depending on its point of
origin and which sectors are invested in, capital and the growth it stimulates can be
detrimental to equality. Foreign dependence and the inequality it allegedly produces
are seen to have a more or less monotonic positive relationship.
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH FINDINGS

In the past ten years there has been a steady trickle of research on determinants

of income inequality in developing countries. Bomschier and Chase-Dunn (1985)
found the traditional measures of level of development (GNP per capita and GNPc 2)
accounted for 25% of the variance in Gini for a sample of 72 rich and poor countries
circa 1968. Their measure of capital penetration (Total Stock of FDI!-VCapital
Stock*Total Population) explained another 25% of variance in Gini for the same
sample.
Steve Chan ( 1989) used three different indicators to measure income inequality
in sixty three developing countries circa 1970: percent of total income accruing to the
top quintile, percent accruing to bottom two quintiles, and the ratio of the two
measures. He used a kitchen sink approach to analysis with a total of twenty
independent variables. Of interest here are his findings regarding foreign capital
penetration (data pulled directly from Bomschier and Chase-Dunn), GNP per capita,
and economic growth rate. Bomschier and Chase-Dunn's penetration measure was
consistently the most powerful predictor of income inequality accounting for roughly
30% of the variance in inequality (R2 differed slightly depending which inequality
measure was used in the equation). Average rate of economic growth was a distant
second and virtually no relation appeared between GNPc and income inequality.
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Crenshaw and Ameen (1993) arrived at the opposite conclusion after analyzing
data for thirty six developing countries circa 1970. Their results demonstrate strongest
support for an association between GNP/capita and its square, population growth rate,
and the percent of the labor force in agriculture. In a regression model including these
variables and Bornschier & Chase-Dunn's capital penetration variable the standardized
regression coefficient for the penetration measure is 0.04. No !-statistic is given but it
is not flagged as being significant at the .05 level and the text of the article dismisses it
as insignificant. They conclude "neither total foreign capital penetration nor
penetration in extractives or agriculture exert any strong influence on inequality in this
analysis.
Pan-Long Tsai (1995) examines circa 1970 data for sixty poor countries and
finds support for a modernization model which includes GNP/capita and percent labor
in agriculture while finding only qualified support for the effect of foreign investment
on income inequality. Tsai uses the book value of the stock ofFDI as a proportion of
GDP to measure foreign capital dependence. Investment dependence is the most
robust predictor of inequality in several models tested with t-values ranging from 2.4
to 4.6. However, Tsai argues the effect ofFDI on inequality is strongest in
East/Southeast Asian countries while being comparatively weak in other regions and
that this gives the appearance of a uniform FDI effect across all countries. The R

2

about 0.5 for his model including investment and trade dependence, GNPc and its
square, percent labor force in agriculture, average economic growth rate, literacy and
16

secondary school enrollment rate, and a measure of government intervention in the
economy.
Francois Nielsen ( 1994) examined intra-national determinants of income
inequality for a set of fifty six rich and poor countries circa 1970. After trying several
different combinations of independent variables he arrived at a core model of four
variables that explain the most variance in Gini with the fewest variables: secondary
school enrollment rate, natural rate of population increase, sector dualism, and percent
of labor force in agriculture as a percent of GDP. These four variables accounted for
nearly eighty percent of the variance in Gini. The !-statistics for all four variables were
consistently significant at the .01 level across several different models. In a follow-up
study Nielsen (1995) found further support for his core model using a pooled
regression model with 279 observations from 88 different countries from 1952 to
1988. He found that his core model captured the curvilinear effect and that adding in
level of development (measured by energy consumption per capita) and its square did
not appreciably increase the R

2

•

Dixon and Boswell (1996) examined circa 1970 data for thirty nine developing
countries (they do not say which ones). Their model included investment dependence,
investment rate, logged GNP per capita and its square, and agricultural inequality. The
adjusted R2 was .55. They found roughly equivalent effects produced by capital
penetration, GNP/capita and its square (t-ratios of 2.4, 2.0, and -1.8 respectively).
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DATA AND METHODS
Sample:
There is no precise empirical definition of what constitutes a 'less developed
country.' Selecting criteria for including countries in my analysis has been a
challenge. My first criterion is geographic. Only non-European countries are
examined herein due to the historical relationship of colonialism between most
European countries and the rest of the world. After this geographic guideline, I have
used two other empirical measures to define two samples ofLDCs.
My first cross section sample of 4 7 LDCs is comprised of non-European
countries designated as either low- or lower middle-income by the World Bank (1992)
(based on 1990 gross national product per capita rankings) and for which income
distribution data (circa 1990) is available. From here on I will refer to this set of
countries as either the 'inclusive sample' or 'original sample'. It is not a
representative or a probability sample. This is an admittedly crude criterion for
inclusion. It is the most inclusive possible definition in order to maximize the sample
size. The problem this introduces is the possibility of curvilinear relations between
inequality and the modernization independent variables as it is unclear where these
countries would fall on Kuznets' inverted U-curve. Nielsen (1994, 1995) argues that
his core model of sector dualism, percent of labor in agriculture, secondary school
enrollment rate, and natural rate of population increase captures both the linear and the
curvilinear effects predicted by Kuznets. To test for this I will include GDP/capita and
18

squared GDP/capita in one of my regression models and see if they add a significant
amount of explanation of the variance in Gini above and beyond what is explained by
the modernization model.
Another way to approach controlling for curvilinear effects is to use only
countries which lie on the ascending leg of the inverted U-curve. My second cross
section of twenty seven countries includes all the countries from the initial set of forty
seven which are to the left of the apex of Kuznets' inverted U-curve. I will refer to
this set as the 'restricted sample' or the 'U-curve sample.' I plotted the log base 10 of
GDP/capita (1990) against the Gini coefficient (circa 1990) for a set of sixty five
countries (my original 47 plus 18 rich nations). 4 The log transform was used at the
suggestion of Francois Nielsen ( 1997) in order to even out the distribution of countries
(according to GDP/capita) which is "typically highly skewed with a long tail to the
right. Logging income makes the distribution more symmetric, which means that
cases in the scatterplot of Gini (vertical axis) by income per capita (horizontal axis) are
better spread out over the graph, allowing more robust estimation of the Kuznets
curve" (517 /97 e-mail from Nielsen to Shattuck). Restricting my sample by this
method is expected to produce only linear (rather than curvilinear) relationships
between Kuznets' independent variables and inequality. I will still try a squared
GDP/capita term in the analyses of this set of countries. The potential benefit of using
this more restrictive inclusion criterion is a more pure representation of hypothesized
modernization effects alone and in comparison to dependency effects.
19

Overview of Model:
The variables and related hypotheses for my cross section analysis are
summarized in Table 2.
None of the theoretical arguments encountered mention anything about lag
effects in the relationship between independent variables and inequality. Most
analyses use concurrent measures of all variables. I will follow suit except in the case
of the 'swarming' and investment dependence variables. Kuznets argued that a rapid
rate of population growth would increase the labor surplus and thereby depress wages
on the low end of the earnings distribution. It seems logical to suppose that a
precipitous rise in the natural rate of population increase would take fifteen or twenty
years to translate into a labor surplus. I will discuss this more below. The foreign
investment measure is from 1978 and is simply the most up to date information I could
find.
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Table 2. Summary of Variables Used in Cross Section Analyses
Abbreviation
GINI
AGLABOR

DUALISM

GROWTH

SWARM

EDUCATE

GDPcPPP

GDPcPPP

FDI

DEBT

AID

2

Description and Source
Circa 1990 Gini coefficient of
inequality (World Bank 1995, 1996)
Percent of total labor force working in
agriculture 1990 (World Bank 1996)
(expressed in decimal form)
Absolute value of the percent of the
labor force in agriculture minus the
percent of GDP produced by the
agricultural sector in 1990 (World
Bank 1996, 1992) (expressed in
decimal form)
Average annual growth rate of Gross
Domestic Product, 1980 - 1990
(World Bank 1992) (expressed in
decimal form)
Natural rate of population increase
1970 (World Bank 1994)
Percentage of age group enrolled in
secondary education (World Bank
1993)
Gross Domestic Product per capita
adjusted for purchasing power parity
1990 (World Bank 1992), millions of
$
GDPcPPP squared

Stock of foreign direct investment as
of the end of 1978 as a proportion of
GDP 1990 (UNCTC 1983 and World
Bank 1992). Natural log transform.
Total external outstanding debt as a
percentage of GNP 1990 (World Bank
1992). Natural log transform.
Average annual official development
aid (from 1986-1990 in 1992 constant
dollars) per capita 1990 (World Bank
1992). Natural log transform.

Related Hypothesis/Prediction
This is the dependent variable
Higher values of AGLABOR
will be negatively associated
with higher values of GINI
Higher values of DUALISM
will be positively associated
with higher values of GINI

Higher values of GROWTH
will be positively associated
with higher values of GINI
Higher values of SWARM
will be positively associated
with higher values of GINI
Higher values of EDUCATE
will be negatively associated
with higher values of GINI
Higher values of GDPcPP P
will be positively associated
with higher values of GINI
Higher values of GDPcPPP2
will be negatively associated
with higher values of GINI
Higher values of FDI will be
positively associated with
higher values of GINI
Higher values of DEBT will
be positively associated with
higher values of GINI
Higher values of AID will be
positively associated with
higher values of GINI
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Dependent Variable:
The 1995 and 1996 World Development Reports list shares of aggregate
income by population quintiles for each nation in the sample. I have used this data to
calculate Gini coefficients of inequality for each country. However, several data
imperfections must be noted. First, the year data was collected for each country varies
from 1981 to 1994 (1990 on average). However, Chan (1989) argues that several
studies indicate income distribution is quite stable over short periods of time and
hence the lack of perfect time matching among countries and between dependent and
independent variables should minimally affect the substantive results of analysis.
Another potential problem with the dependent measure is its cross sectional
nature. Kuznets (1955) pointed out that nations in the early stages of industrialization
may be more vulnerable to "transient disturbances" of the economy such as crop
failures and natural calamities because they lack the infrastructure and resources
'cushion' that more developed countries have to mitigate such adverse effects. Thus,
income distributions may fluctuate in LDCs quite dramatically from year to year and
measures based on only one year (as opposed to multi-year averaging) may be
misleading. However, as noted above, several studies have demonstrated that income
distributions in LDCs are quite stable over short periods of time ( 5 to 10 years).
Ahluwalia (1974) argued that even though this kind of cross national data is
fraught with problems "they are also the only data we have" (p.34). Therefore, I
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propose that the results of this kind of empirical analysis should be taken as suggestive
rather than conclusive.

Modernization Independent Variables:
1. AGLABOR: Percentage of total labor force working in agriculture 1990. (Labor

force is the population between 15 and 64 years of age. Agriculture includes
farming, hunting, fishing, forestry, and livestock raising.) The percent of the labor
force employed in the agricultural sector is expected to be inversely related to
overall inequality. Remember that Kuznets argued economic modernization entails
a shift of population and labor from rural agriculture to urban industry. The effect
this population shift will have on national income inequality will depend on the
magnitude of shift, the inequality of the distribution of income within each sector,
and the difference in average wages between the two sectors. An ideal analysis of
income inequality would thus include measures of the difference in average
income between the two sectors (sectoral dualism), the distribution of income
within each sector, and the share of the labor force within each sector. The
distribution of income within each sector is unavailable for most countries.
However, we can construct measures of sectoral dualism and the share of labor
force in each sector. Kuznets assumed that income is generally more equally
distributed in the agricultural sector than in the urban sector. "The income
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distribution of the total population, in the simplest model, may therefore be viewed
as a combination of the income distribution of the rural and of the urban
populations .... all other conditions being equal, the increasing weight of urban
population means an increasing share for the more unequal of the two component
distributions" (Kuznets 1955, pp. 7-8). As data on the distribution of income
within each sector is generally unavailable we assume that a shift of labor force
from the more equally distributed agricultural sector to the less equally distributed
urban sector will increase inequality.
2. DUALISM: Absolute value of the percent of the labor force in agriculture minus
the percent of GDP produced by the agricultural sector in 1990 (following Nielsen
1994 5). Dualism is expected to be positively associated with inequality. The
difference in average income between the rural and urban sectors is one of the
other components of changing national income inequality resulting from a shift of
labor.
3. SWARM: The natural rate of population increase in 1970. Swarming is expected
to be positively associated with inequality. Kuznets asserted "the 'swarming' of
population incident upon a rapid decline in death rates and the maintenance or
even rise of birth rates, would be unfavorable to the relative economic position of
lower-income groups." (1955 p.18) Rapid population growth is expected to
increase the labor surplus thereby driving wages down at the low end of the wage
distribution and resulting in increased income inequality. This is the only
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independent variable for which I can make a clear argument for lag effects. If the
natural rate of population increase is high then it is reasonable to speculate the
resultant birth cohort will not have a potentially depressant effect on wages until
they reach working age. Thus, I would argue against Nielsen's ( 1994) approach of
using the natural rate of population increase concurrent with the measure of
inequality as an indicator of swarming. I think it is logical to use a twenty year lag.
A high rate of natural increase is hypothesized to increase inequality twenty years
later as that birth cohort enters the labor force.
4. GROWTH: The average annual growth of gross domestic product from 1980 to
1990. Growth is expected to be positively associated with inequality. Kuznets
argued that rapid economic growth leads to fortune building which increases the
share of wealth at the top end of the earnings distribution and hence increases
inequality.
5. EDUCATE: Percentage of age group enrolled in secondary education as of 1990.
This is a measure of the spread of human capital and is expected to have a negative
relation with inequality following Nielsen's arguments ( 1994 & 199 5) described
above.
6. GDPcPPP: Gross domestic product per capita 1990 adjusted for purchasing power
parity. This measures overall level of economic development. GDP per capita is
expected to be positively associated with inequality. "One might thus assume a
long swing in the inequality characterizing the secular income structure: widening
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in the early phases of economic growth when the transition from the pre-industrial
to the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and
then narrowing in the later phases. This long secular swing would be most
pronounced for older countries where the dislocation effects of the earlier phases
of modem economic growth were most conspicuous; but it might be found also in
the 'younger' countries like the United States ... " (Kuznets, 1955 p 18, emphasis
added). This is the classic statement of the famed 'inverted U-curve hypothesis.'
This is frequently interpreted by researchers as implying a curvilinear relationship
between 'level of development' and inequality. However, in the context of his
overall argument and taking note of the highlighted words it has become clear to
me that Kuznets was primarily making an argument about the relationship between
the dislocating and sectoral shift effects of industrialization and urbanization
frequently accompanying 'development.' Thus, 'level of development' is really
referring to the concepts of dualism and relative integration into the modem
market sector. However, most researchers utilize gross domestic or national
product per capita as a catch-all measure of level of development and ignore the
more detailed process Kuznets described. Nielsen (1995) and Lecaillon et. al.
(1984) are the only researchers I have found who specifically note this important
distinction. It is clear that in many developing countries with export processing
zones located away from existing urban centers that there is little or no connection
between urbanization and industrialization or growth in productivity. Similarly,
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growth in productivity may increase with little sectoral labor shift in countries
whose wealth creation comes from extractive industries such as mining or oil. The
best rationale I have found for including a measure of national productivity comes
from Pan-Long Tsai (1995). He suggests that some growth in economic surplus is
generally a prerequisite to a growth in inequality of the distribution of wealth. Of
course this ignores the role of brute force and social organizations such as caste
and slavery in creating economic inequality. However, all other things being
equal, it stands to reason that countries with virtually no productive wealth have
less 'latent potential' for unequal distribution than countries with some form of
surplus wealth. Thus, the hypothesized link between relative level of national
productivity and inequality remains rather fuzzy. Therefore, I will follow Nielsen
by including productivity in a separate model after first examining the previous
indicators of aglabor, dualism, swarming, education, and growth rate.
7. GDPcPPP 2 : This squared term is intended to capture inverted u-curve effects not
explained by the theoretically derived variables.

Dependency Independent Variables:
The distributions of all three dependency variables are highly skewed with long
tails to the right. In order to use them in regression analyses I performed a natural log
transformation for each which dramatically evens out their distributions. (See
Appendix B for original and transformed distributions).
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1. FDI: Stock of foreign direct investment as of the end of 1978 as a proportion of
Gross Domestic Product (1990). Investment dependence is expected to be
positively associated with inequality. According to Bornschier and Chase-DWlll
(1985) an ideal measure of investment dependence is the total accumulated stock
invested in an LDC by transnational corporations weighted by a nation's overall
total capital stock and the size of the labor force (capital and labor being two major
factors of production). The measure they actually use substitutes total population
as a proxy for labor force. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find data on
nations' total capital stock. My measure follows that used by Dixon and Boswell
( 1996) and is as good as available data allows.
2. DEBT: Total external outstanding debt as a percentage of GNP (1990). Debt
dependence is expected to be positively related to inequality based on the
arguments presented above. The only recent study I have found that uses a debt
dependence measure (debt service as a proportion of GNP) is Chan (1989).
However, annual debt service fluctuates dramatically along with changes in
interest rates which renders this an unreliable measure in my opinion. I have
chosen to use the net present value of total external debt as a percentage of GNP in
1990. This is a widely available measure that is frequently used by banks in loan
eligibility analyses. It gives an indication of how much outstanding debt a country
has relative to its overall level of economic productivity.
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3. AID: The five year average (in 1992 dollars) of annual net disbursements
(includes "gross disbursements less payments to the originators of aid for
amortization of past aid receipts", World Bank 1995, p. 238) of official
development assistance (includes loans, grants and technical assistance) from all
sources 1986 to 1990 per capita (population in 1990). Based on the dependency
argument of Nembhard (1993) aid dependence is expected to be positively
associated with inequality.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 presents the inclusive sample of forty seven countries ranked by circa
1990 Gini coefficients and includes the year income distribution data was actually
collected.

TABLE 3. Inclusive Sample Ranked by Gini c. 1990
COUNTRY
Brazil
Guatemala*
Tanzania*
Honduras*
South Africa
Panama
Zimbabwe*
Kenya*
Lesotho*
Chile
Botswana
Senegal*
Venezuela
Colombia
Mexico
Dominican
Rep.*
Nicaragua
Malaysia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Peru*
Thailand
Zambia*

ACTUAL
YEAR
1989
1989
1991
1989
1993
1989
1990-91
1992
1986-87
1992
1985-86
1991-92
1990
1991
1992
1989

GINI c.
1990
0.569
0.538
0.535
0.533
0.528
0.518
0.511
0.510
0.508
0.502
0.492
0.490
0.486
0.469
0.460
0.459

1993
1989
1989
1994
1994
1988
1991

0.456
0.441
0.425
0.422
0.413
0.400
0.398

COUNTRY
Nigeria*
Mauritania*
Bolivia*
Jamaica
Philippines*
Jordan
Tunisia
Morocco*
Algeria
Cote d'Ivoire*
Ghana*
China*
Vietnam
Korea, Rep.
Uganda*
Indonesia*

ACTUAL
YEAR
1992
1987-88
1990-91
1990
1988
1991
1990
1990-91
1988
1988
1988-89
1990
1992
1988
1989-90
1990

GINI c.
1990
0.395
0.393
0.390
0.384
0.375
0.372
0.370
0.362
0.356
0.342
0.339
0.337
0.330
0.316
0.305
0.304

Egypt
Ethiopia*
India*
Pakistan*
Nepal*
Sri Lanka*
Rwanda*
Bangladesh*

1991
1981-82
1989
1991
1984-85
1990
1983-84
1988-89

0.295
0.294
0.294
0.287
0.279
0.278
0.268
0.265

N=47, Average Gini = 0.404, Average year of measurement= 1990, *=countries included in
restricted sample
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Table 4 presents descriptive information about all of the variables in the
inclusive sample. Table 5 is the correlation matrix for all variables.

TABLE 4. Summary of Cross Section Variables

GINI
AGLABOR
DUALISM
SWARM
EDUCATE
GROWTH
GDPcPPP
GDPcPPP2
lnFDI
lnDEBT
In AID

Minimum

Maximum

0.265
0.12
0.06
19
4
-0.02
310
96,100
-5.67
2.67
-.69

0.569
0.94
0.58
37
87
0.11
7190
51696100
-.41
5.64
5.14

Range

Mean

Stnd.
Dev.

N

0.304
0.82
0.52
18
83
0.14
6880
51,600,000
5.25
2.97
5.83

0.404
0.48
0.26
28
39.81
0.03
2931
12,000,057
-3.52
4.21
2.78

0.089
0.23
0.16
4.5
20.96
0.03
1867
13,357,477
1.13
0.71
1.41

47
47
43
45
43
45
45
45
43
44
46

GINI, the modernization and the log transformed dependency independent
variables are all pretty evenly distributed around their means. Prior to running the
regression analyses I examined box plots of all independent variables and scatter plots
of all independent variables against the dependent variable to check for non-linearity,
outliers, and possible threshold or ceiling effects. I could detect none of these
problems visually with any of the variables. The regression results are presented in
Tables 6 and 7. All models were computed using the ordinary least squares method.
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Variable
1 GINI

4
2
3
5
1
1.000
(47)
1.000
-.368
2 AGLABOR
(47)
(47)
.742
1.000
-.093
3 DUALISM
(43)
(43)
(43)
1.000
.151
.200
.233
4 SWARM
(42)
(45)
(45)
(45)
-.320
-.294
1.000
-.042
-.634
5 EDUCATE
(39)
(42)
(43)
(43)
(43)
-.169
.200
.120
.230
-.246
6 GROWTH
(45)
(42)
(45)
(42)
(45)
-.125
-.494
.633
-.825
.335
7 GDPc
(44)
(43)
(41)
(45)
(45)
2
-.155
.547
-.735
-.457
.295
8 GDPc
(44)
(41)
(45)
(43)
(45)
.186
-.049
.041
-.275
.600
9 lnFDI
(42)
(43)
(41)
(40)
(43)
.191
-.286
.186
.229
.070
10 lnAID
(44)
(46)
(42)
(43)
(46)
.078
-.151
-.277
.084
.018
11 lnDEBT
(44)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
Coefficients calculated using pairwise deletion, number of cases in parentheses
7

1.000
(45)
.970
(45)
.094
(43)
-.423
(44)
-.291
(44)

6

1.000
(45)
.185
(44)
.189
(44)
-.460
(42)
-.244
(44)
-.608
(43)

Table 5: Correlation Matrix for all Variables: Inclusive Data Set, 47 Countries

1.000
(45)
.041
(43)
-.496
(44)
-.306
(44)

8

1.000
(43)
.150
(43)
.441
(43)

9

1.000
(46)
.534
(44)

10

1.000
(44)

11
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t

39

39

39

N
** p ~ .01, * p ~ .05,

.344

.268

.294

.298

t-statistics in parentheses

.360

.384

.387

.423
38

43

.501

.562

.410**
(2.960)

-.613*
(-2.545)
.265
(1.390)
.168
(1.233)
-.365*
(-2.077)

Model6

.374

.419

.721 **
(5.281)
.037
(.263)
-.287
(-1.853)
.758

Model5

Constant coefficients are unstandardized

43

.571

.409

.466

.372

.600**
(4.802)

Model4

.458

.643
(.772)
-.498
(-.750)

-.710
(-1.920)
.342
(1.547)
.203
(1.297)
-.525*
(-2.557)

-.868**
(-3.524)
.426*
(2.033)
.223
(1.514)
-.426*
(-2.219)
-.132
(-.896)

-.879**
(-3.580)
.391
(1.907)
.237
(1.618)
-.468*
(-2.517)

Constantt
R2
Ad_justed R 2

lnDEBT

lnAID

lnFDI

GDPc 2

GD Pc

GROWTH

EDUCATE

SWARM

DUALISM

AGLABOR

Model3

Model2

Model 1

38

.445

.550

.466

1.102
(1.463)
-.618
(-1.046)
.500**
(3.403)

-.093
(-.248)
.135
(.673)
.073
(.507)
-.458*
(-2.511)

Model 7

38

.427

.535

.558**
(3.215)
.084
(.533)
-.272
(-1.481)
.751

-.480
(-1.854)
.134
(.634)
.144
(1.055)
-.383*
(-2.178)

Model8

Table 6: Standardized Coefficients for the Regression of circa 1990 Gini on Various Groupings of Independent
Variables: Inclusive Data Set, 47 countries.
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.429

.568

.898
(1.106)
-.484
(-.727)
.593**
(3.382)
.086
(.472)
-.203
(-1.070)
.618

-.079
(-.207)
.054
(.247)
.072
(.493)
-.454*
(-2.431)
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Model9

Table 6 presents the regression results for the inclusive data set of all 4 7
countries. Model 1 is the same as Nielsen's (1994 & 1995) core model. In analyses of
56 countries circa 1970 Nielsen ( 1994) consistently came up with coefficients with !statistics significant at the .05 level and an R2 around .800. My sample produces an
adjusted R 2 of .298 from Nielsen's core model variables of percent labor in
agriculture, dualism, population swarming, and spread of education. The difference in
our results may be largely due to the fact he included rich countries in his analysis
which would possibly accentuate coefficients of a model which is designed to capture
curvilinear relationships found in a sample with both rich and poor countries. Since
my sample includes only low and middle income countries, the curvilinear effects
described by his core model may be attenuated in this analysis.
Model 2 adds in the growth variable derived from Kuznets. High growth rates
were expected to lead to rapid rates of fortune building among the wealthy members of
society and thence to increase inequality. However, the negative correlation
coefficient between GROWTH and GINI from Table 5 combined with the negative
regression coefficient of model 2 in Table 6 would seem to refute this hypothesis.
Also, the addition of the growth variable adds virtually nothing to the explanatory
power of Nielsen's core model.
Model 3 adds in level of development measures to Model 1. As predicted,
these variables add virtually nothing to the explanatory power of Nielsen's core model.
This bolsters his assertion that the four variables in Model 1 of Table 6 capture the
34

relation between development and inequality better than a summary measure of
development. While not presented in the results table, I did a regression model with
just GDP and GDP2 . The R2 was only .086 with neither coefficient's !-statistic even
close to significance at the .05 level.
Model 4 shows the coefficient for the investment dependence measure. I
separated this out from the other dependence measures because investment
dependence is much more thoroughly theorized and specified in the literature than the
other two dependence measures. I wanted to be able to compare my findings with
previous research. The high R2 and robust !-statistic indicate that investment
dependence alone is a very strong predictor of income inequality for this sample of
countries.
Model 5 adds the other two dependence measures to create a complete
dependency model. The aid measure is consistently insignificant across all models.
This may be an artifact of it being a flow measure rather than a penetration measure.
Perhaps in the future it would be worth trying to construct a measure of cumulative
foreign aid weighted by the size of the economy. Interestingly the debt measure
consistently has a negative coefficient and falls just short of significance at the .05
level. This is opposite the expected positive relation between debt and inequality. The
very low correlation between debt and inequality (0.084) indicates that debt's inverse
relation with Gini only occurs when investment dependence is held constant.
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Model 6 presents Nielsen's core model plus the investment dependence
measure. The robust significance of investment dependence across models and the
difference of roughly 0.1 in R 2 between model 1 and model 6 indicate Nielsen was
incorrect in assuming dependency would effect inequality mainly via the variables in
his core model. Investment dependence clearly has a substantial effect on inequality
independent of Nielsen's core model variables.
Models 7, 8, and 9 merely try different combinations of variables to see which
ones are most robust. The education and investment dependence measures are the
most robust predictors of inequality across all the different models. AGLABOR is
extremely attenuated in combination with the GDP and investment dependence
measures indicating possible collinearity problems.
Table 7 presents the regression results of four models using only the 27
countries on the ascending leg of the Kuznets inverted U-curve. This is intended as
another way of controlling for curvilinear effects. The drop in R 2 for Nielsen's core
model (model I in both tables) from Table 6 to Table 7 further suggests that his model
is strongest as a predictor of curvilinear effects found in a larger sample including both
rich and poor countries. The increased robustness of the investment dependence
measure indicates the possibility that dependency is a stronger predictor of inequality
for very poor countries than for a mix of poor and middle income countries. This
further supports the work of Bomschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) who assert that
investment penetration has the greatest impact on inequality in very poor countries and
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comes to have an inverse relation with inequality in rich countries. Thus, if we were to
model the effect of investment penetration for a large sample of rich and poor
countries it would be advisable to use a quadratic function for the investment measure
or use a dummy variable for rich/poor to tease out this opposite effect.
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I-statistics in parentheses

** p ~ .01, * p ~ .05,

t Constant coefficients are unstandardized

Table 7: Standardized Coefficients for the Regression of circa 1990 Gini on Various Groupings of Independent
Variables: Restricted U-curve Data Set, 27 countries.
Model2
Model3
Model4
Model 1
-.466
-.603*
-.278
AG LABOR
(-1.205)
(-2.224)
(-1.025)
.328
.106
.353
DUALISM
(1.300)
(1.479)
(.463)
.236
.271
.106
SWARM
(1.113)
(1.408)
(.583)
-.441
-.261
EDUCATE
-.332
(-1.464)
(-1.456)
(-1.266)
.171
GD Pc
(.153)
.061
GDPc 2
(.065)
.650**
.541 *
lnFDI
(4.195)
(2.716)
.357
.600
.402
.609
Constantt
R2
.282
.296
.423
.478
2
.145
.073
.399
.340
Ad.iusted R
26
26
25
26
N
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Dixon and Boswell ( 1996), Crenshaw and Ameen ( 1993 ), Chan ( 1989), PanLong Tsai (1995), and Bomschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) all use logged GNP and
GNP2 measures in their analyses of inequality in LDCs. I wonder to what extent this
affected their results. Using a log transform can be justified when examining both rich
and poor countries because, as noted above, this tends to yield a highly skewed
distribution with a long tail to the right. However, in analyses that examine only poor
countries I challenge this practice and suspect it may introduce false effects. GDP per
capita was quite evenly distributed for my sample of countries. Also, I could discern
no curvilinear relation between GDPc and GINI either in a scatterplot or by comparing
linear to quadratic equation results in bivariate regressions. In order to compare my
results to others I tried using the natural log of GDP and its square. I found that this
did nothing to improve the distribution of these variables and that using the logged
terms in regression equations did not change the substantive results.

39

CONCLUSIONS
I set out to test hypotheses about the causes of income inequality in developing
countries derived from two different theoretical perspectives. I found support for
some hypotheses from each theory.
Because different researchers use different models it is impossible to make
pure comparisons with my results. However, my model seems to demonstrate a
stronger relationship between investment dependence and inequality compared to the
findings ofBomschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), Chan (1989), Crenshaw and Ameen
(1993), Pan-Long Tsai (1995), and Dixon and Boswell (1996). The investment
dependence measure in my model accounted for roughly 35% of the variance in
inequality for my sample of 4 7 countries. This is higher than Bomschier and ChaseDunn' s (1985) 25% and Chan's (1989) 30% figures. This lends support to the notion
that dependency effects have increased apace intensified economic integration since
the 1970s.
Furthermore, it is clear that investment dependence exerts an effect on
inequality independent of Nielsen's core modernization model. Thus, foreign
investment may influence inequality partially, but certainly not entirely, through the
variables of dualism, percent labor in agriculture, secondary education enrollment rate,
and population growth. I think the bottom line is that we need to examine both intra-
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and inter-national factors in order to develop a thorough explanation of income
inequality.
It is interesting to note that none of my models explained as much total

variance in inequality as any of the previous researchers. As noted above, various
models from different studies accounted for anywhere between 50% and 80% of
variance in inequality for different sets of countries circa 1970. This is possibly an
artifact of differences in methodology. However, it also seems possible this is due to a
diminished explanatory power of traditional modernization variables since the late
1960s. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that none of my modernization models
(Nielsen's core model or the combination of GDPc and its square) explained nearly as
much variance in inequality as ones tested on circa 1970 data. Much has changed in
the world economy since 1970. These changes and their effects would be a fruitful
direction for future research to consider.
My findings demonstrate no support for the hypothesized effects of economic
growth, foreign aid, and foreign debt. The operationalization of the aid dependence
measure should be reconsidered in future research in order to take account of the
cumulative effect of aid over time. The apparent inverse relation between growth and
inequality warrants further investigation. The inverse relation between debt and
inequality when investment dependence is held constant also deserves more
consideration.
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The reason most social scientists study a topic like inequality is because we are
concerned about poverty and injustice. The implicit assumption in most cross national
income inequality studies is ceteris paribus, the lower the Gini, the better off people
are in that country compared to other countries. However, as a dependent variable, the
Gini coefficient does not hold all other things equal. Less developed countries with
low income inequality also tend to be the poorest of the poor and have a very high
percentage of the population working in agriculture. It is important to remember that
the Gini is merely a measure of the distribution of income with no reference to a
nation's level of income. Thus, a low Gini in a very poor country simply means that
poverty is equally distributed.
This study has made me wonder about the relation between income inequality
and other measures such as the Physical Quality of Life Index or the United Nations'
Human Development Index. I would also like to try grouping countries into
comparable levels of national productivity and see how this affects my results. I am
currently developing a measure of income inequality that is weighted by national
wealth in order to more accurately compare the economic welfare of the poorest
members of different countries. This would be a good direction for future research.
Another next step for my continuation of this line of research includes learning
about regression diagnostics. One thing I have learned from this project is how the
substance of quantitative findings can hinge on relatively subtle methodological
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details. Delving into these analyses has made me a skeptical consumer of quantitative
research literature.
Finally, I need to immerse myself more in the historical details and theoretical
accounts of globalization and development. I have raised several interesting questions
in this project which I simply do not have the knowledge base to answer at this point.
I am particularly interested in exploring the possibility of diminished modernization
and intensified dependency effects since the 1970s.
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APPENDIX A: EXPLANATION OF GINI COEFFICIENT
The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure of inequality based on the
Lorenz curve that is easily calculated given quintile income distribution data. The
chart below relates the cumulative percent of aggregate income earned by quintiles to
quintiles of the population. The straight diagonal line represents perfect equality
wherein each unit (individual, family, household) earns the same income. The other
two lines represent the Lorenz curves of Hungary and Brazil circa 1990. The Gini
coefficient is simply the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of
perfect equality to the total area under the line of perfect equality. The formula I used
is derived from Ehrenberg and Smith (1994, p. 557).

(.5 - (.1 + .2 *quint!+ .2 *(quint!+ quint2) + .2 *(quint!+ quint2 + quint3) + .2 * (quintl + quint2 +
quint3 + quint4)))

.5

quint I through 4 = the quintile's share of aggregate income expressed in decimal
form.
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ENDNOTES

While not an object of empirical investigation in my paper, no discussion of
inequality in LDCs would be complete without some mention of urban bias theory. In
essence this perspective proposes that economic development in LDCs is biased in
favor of urban areas and residents due to the political dominance of urban political
elites and interest groups. Michael Lipton originated this theory and sums it up
succinctly:
The most important class conflict in the poor countries of the world today is
not between labor and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national interests.
It is between the rural classes and the urban classes. The rural sector contains
most of the poverty, and most of the low-cost sources of potential advance; but
the urban sector contains most of the articulateness, organization, and power.
(1976, p. 13)
This seminal work inspired an outpouring of research and policy looking at the
urban bias issue in development. The urban bias perspective came to dominate more
than a decade of research and policy initiatives sponsored by development agencies
like the World Bank. Along the way, urban bias has been criticized for its neglect of
the influence of different kinds of political systems on rural representation, ignoring
other bases for identity formation (religious and ethnic) that can cut across rural-urban
politics, and for skirting the issue of defining the boundary between rural and urban
(Varshney, 1993).
Recently Lipton has sought to defend and clarify his hypothesis. He argues
that urban bias "is defined upon outcomes, not causes or processes" (1993, p. 231 ). In
other words, urban bias is any outcome that "persistently favors urban people vis-a-vis
rural" people independent of the causal factors involved (1993, p. 231). Four
dimensions of outcomes are proposed to detect the existence of urban bias: static
efficiency, dynamic efficiency, income/poverty distribution, and sustainability (fiscal,
administrative and environmental). Lipton argues that it is not enough to demonstrate
a lack of urban bias in just one dimension (for instance commodity price indicators) in
order to disprove the existence of urban bias.
In this paper I am interested in broadly conceived overall national income
inequality. Urban bias posits an inter-sectoral and inter-regional income inequality
that is outside the scope of this paper's goals (and incidentally virtually impossible to
examine cross-nationally because of the lack of data broken down by sector). Also,
urban bias as formulated by Lipton avoids specifying a causal model with specific
independent variables and is thus inappropriate for the kind of cross-national
inferential research I am undertaking.
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2

In a summary review of literature relating to the connection between
democracy and inequality Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles (1991) foWld a wide variety
of conflicting theories and evidence. According to Sirowy and Inkeles, Lipset (1959)
argues that democratic institutions enhance equity while Beitz (1982) argues that
authoritarian regimes have more potential for equity. Many Marxists on the other
hand see the political system as mostly irrelevant to the issue of distributional equity.
Sirowy and Inkeles go on to review twelve research articles that examine the
link between democracy and inequality. Seven studies foWld an inverse relationship
while five others foWld either no link or a positive relation between inequality and
democracy. Some of this variation is probably due to differences in model
specification, measurement, and sample selection. The relationship between
government institutions and inequality is most likely substantial. However, due to the
problems associated with specification, operationalization, and data availability I will
not include this as an independent variable in my analysis.

3

Throughout this paper, FDI will be used to denote "investment that is made to
acquire a lasting interest (usually 10% of the voting stock) in an enterprise operating in
a coWltry other than that of the investor, the investor's purpose being an effective
voice in the management of the enterprise." (p. 239, World Bank, 1995)
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4

Scatter plot of Kuznets' inverted U-curve:

Quadratic function fitted to data
Apex= Bl/2*B2
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5

This measure of sector dualism is derived from a special case of the Gini coefficient.
See Nielsen ( 1994) for an extended discussion of the derivation.
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